Contracts by Hadden, Hugh M.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 29 
Issue 1 Annual Survey of South Carolina Article 6 
1977 
Contracts 
Hugh M. Hadden 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hadden, Hugh M. (1977) "Contracts," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 29 : Iss. 1 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 




Elk & Jacobs Drywall v. Town Contractors, Inc.,' decided
during the survey year, involved an interpretation of a retainage
clause in a contract between a subcontractor and a general con-
tractor. The case arose out of a contract between Town Contrac-
tors, Inc., the general contractor for the construction of an apart-
ment complex, and Elk & Jacobs Drywall, the subcontractor. The
contract called for Elk & Jacobs Drywall to install the sheetrock
and other incidentals in the apartment complex for the total
amount of $103,000.00. A retainage of $10,300.00 was to be with-
held and paid sixty days after the occurrence of the later of sev-
eral events. The disputed provision, subparagraph (iv), provided
for payment to the subcontractor after "[fjull and final payment
to the Contractor of all the funds due him for this project."' Elk
& Jacobs Drywall, having made a full and complete performance
of their obligation under the contract,3 brought suit to recover the
balance retained by Town Contractors, Inc. pursuant to the re-
tainage clause. Town Contractors contended that since it had not
received full payment from the owner, it was not yet liable on the
contract. The lower court directed a verdict in favor of Town
Contractors, in effect, interpreting the provision as a condition
precedent4 to its liability.5 The Supreme Court of South Carolina
reversed.
The basis of the supreme court's decision was that there was
nothing in the contract between the general contractor and the
subcontractor that evidenced an intention that the latter would
assume the risk of the owner's default or delay of payments to the
general contractor;' in fact, the contract itself stated that the
1. 267 S.C. 412, 229 S.E.2d 260 (1976).
2. Id. at 415, 229 S.E.2d at 261.
3. Id.
4. A condition precedent is an act or event, other than a lapse of time, which must
exist or occur before a duty of immediate performance of a promise arises. RESTATEMENT
(FitsT) OF CoNTRAcrs § 250(a), Comment d (1932). It is further described as "a fact or
event which the parties intend must exist or take place before there is a right to perform-
ance, . . . distinguished from a promise in that it creates no right or duty in and of itself
but is merely a limiting or modifying factor." 5 S. WILNSTON, CONRAcrs § 663 (1961)
(quoting Lach v. Cahill, 138 Conn. 418, 421, 85 A.2d 481, 482 (1951)).
5. 267 S.C. at 416, 229 S.E.2d at 261.
6. Id. at 418, 229 S.E.2d at 262.
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purpose of the retainage was "to insure the Subcontractors [sic]
full and complete performance." 7 This decision presupposed that
it is normally the general contractor rather than the subcontrac-
tor who takes the risk of the owner's nonpayment.8 Finding no
intention to shift this risk, the court held that subparagraph (iv)
did not create a condition precedent to payment9 of the retained
amount, but "rather only postponed payment by Town for a rea-
sonable time so as to afford [it] an opportunity to obtain funds
from the owner."' 0 This interpretation is in accordance with deci-
sions of other courts confronted with similar provisions."
This case illustrates the problem of determining whether a
condition is intended. To further complicate the problem, the
desire of courts to give substantial justice in the particular case
before them has sometimes introduced difficulty where as a mat-
ter of language none would exist.' 2 Thus, if a true condition pre-
7. Id. at 415, 229 S.E.2d at 261.
8. See Thos. J. Dyer Co. v. Bishop Int'l Eng'r Co., 303 F.2d 655, 660-61 (6th Cir.
1962), where the court explained that it is normally the general contractor rather than the
subcontractor who takes the risk of the owner's nonpayment.
9. "Whether a provision in a contract is a condition the nonfulfillment of which
excuses performance, depends upon the intent of the parties, to be ascertained from a fair
and reasonable construction of the language used in the light of all the surrounding
circumstances when they executed the contract." 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 663 (1961)
(citations omitted). Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 252 (1973). Therefore,
custom and usage in the particular field are given great weight in the determination of
the probable intention of the parties. In light of the usual allocation of the risks between
the general contractor and the subcontractor, see note 8 supra, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court in Town Contractors further noted that:
As a practical matter the suppliers and small contractors on large construction
projects need reasonably prompt payment for their work and materials in order
for them to remain solvent and stay in business. "In the absence of a clear
expression in the contract papers that the credit risk of the general contractor
and the delay in payment frequently attending on construction projects are
meant to be shifted to such suppliers and subcontractors, the contract instru-
ments should not be construed as intending such assumption." Schuler-Haas
Elec. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 49 A.D.2d 60, 371 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1975).
267 S.C. at 418, 229 S.E.2d at 262.
10. Id. at 418, 229 S.E.2d at 262.
11. The supreme court cited ample authority of courts in other jurisdictions reaching
the same conclusion when faced with similar issues. E.g., Thos. J. Dyer Co. v. Bishop Int'l
Eng'r Co., 303 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1962); A. J. Wolfe Co. v. Baltimore Contractors, Inc.,
335 Mass. 361, 244 N.E.2d 717 (1969); Howard-Green Elec. Co. v. Chaney & Jones Constr.
Co., 12 N.C. App. 63, 182 S.E.2d 601 (1971).
12. Williston explains this anomaly as follows:
When courts hold a promisor liable in spite of the non-performance of a condi-
tion . . ., they generally purport to reach the results which they achieve by
interpretation of the contract; but they are unquestionably doing something
more than ascertaining the meaning of the language which the parties use. They
2
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cedent is intended by the parties, the language of the condition,
to be enforced, must be plain, specific, and precise, showing that
the parties intended to create a condition precedent. 3
II. OPTION CONTRACTS
South Carolina adheres to the premise that option contracts,
being unilateral, are strictly construed in favor of the optionor
and against the party claiming the option.' 4 In Cotter v. James
L. Tapp Co." the South Carolina Supreme Court extended this
principle to require exact compliance with the terms of the option
by the optionee to enforce a renewal option. The court framed the
issue, upon motion for summary judgment, as whether defen-
dant, a South Carolina corporation, had taken "adequate legal
steps to exercise [a] renewal option"" in a lease with the plain-
tiff to make the option a binding agreement.
The plaintiff operates as the landlord of the Dutch Square
Shopping Center wherein the defendant leases space to maintain
and operate a department store. The controversy arose out of the
lease agreement which, among other things, granted Tapp two
options: (1) An option to expand whereby Tapp was given the
option to expand into two expansion areas during the first five
years of its lease; and (2) a renewal option whereby Tapp was
given the option to renew its option to expand for an additional
three years "upon the payment by tenant (Tapp) of thirty cents
per sq. ft. per year for said expansion area, payable monthly as
are disregarding the condition altogether, in spite of the fact that as a matter
of English its meaning is perfectly plain.
The reason given in the cases is that the particular contingency which has
arisen, though the language of the contract is wide enough to include it, was
presumably not intended by the parties to be covered. This inference is often
drawn where the only reason the court has for supposing that the parties did
not have in mind the contingency is that the terms of the contract, if literally
applied, produce a harsh and unreasonable result.
5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTs § 806 (1961).
13. At least one writer has suggested that the law of contracts should eliminate the
technicalities inherent in the law of conditions and adopt an "unequivocal statement that
conditions are never effective beyond their materiality." This would replace the myth of
the old law and substitute the policy of supporting and promoting good faith conduct
according to reasonable standards. Childres, Conditions in the Law of Contracts, 45
N.Y.U.L. Rv. 33, 58 (1970).
14. E.g., Southern Silica Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Haefer, 215 S.C. 480, 497, 56 S.E.2d
321, 328 (1949); A.C. Tuxbury Lumber Co. v. Byrd, 131 S.C. 32, 127 S.E. 267 (1925).
15. - S.C. - , 230 S.E.2d 715 (1976).
16. Id. at , 230 S.E.2d at 716.
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an option cost."' 7 Prior to the expiration date, March 1, 1975,
Tapp had neither exercised the primary option to expand nor
paid or tendered to the plaintiffs the cost of the renewal option.
Tapp had, however, given notice of its desire to exercise the re-
newal option in a letter dated February 13, 1975, prior to the
expiration date, stating: "We are very anxious to proceed with the
expansion and wish to take this opportunity to notify you that we
wish to exercise our option as per our contract under Article
XXXII, to reserve the expansion space until such time as we do
expand."'" On June 13, 1975, "the plaintiffs notified defendant
that the option to expand had terminated for failure to pay the
option cost."'" Tapp thereafter tendered payment on June 30,
1975, which was rejected by the plaintiff.
The lessor then filed an action for declaratory judgment to
determine the rights of the parties under the lease. 2 The trial
judge determined as a matter of law that the defendant's letter
to plaintiffs was not sufficient to exercise the renewal option with-
out actual tender to pay the option cost, and thus granted plain-
tiff a summary judgment.2 ' The South Carolina Supreme Court,
with two justices dissenting, affirmed the decision of the lower
court, adopting the opinion of the trial judge as its own.
Generally, "[a]n option for Which consideration is given
is a contract, but it is also an offer which, when accepted,
creates another contract .... ,,22 The option "is a 'binding'
promise, because a consideration was paid for it; it is an 'offer,'
because it invites a second and different exchange of equiva-
lents. 21 3 The offer element of an option must be accepted accord-
17. Id.
18. Id. at -, 230 S.E.2d at 717.
19. Id.
20. Id. at -, 230 S.E.2d at 716.
21. The lower court concluded that "there exists no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment for the reason that payment of
the option cost was clearly required by the terms of the renewal option and under the
existing law in South Carolina." Id. at _., 230 S.E.2d at 717.
22. 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 25 (1957). Although there is a conceptual dispute
as to whether an option is an offer to make a bilateral contract, the acceptance of which
completes such contract, or whether an option is a conditional unilateral contract, and
that acceptance is the performance of the condition, the result is the same. "There is no
completed contract . . . until the optionee [Tapp] has accepted the offer according to
its terms, or, . . has performed the condition contained in the offer. . . . No mutual
agreement exists prior to the acceptance." 1A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 264 n.44 (1963)
(citations omitted).
23. 1A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 264 (1963).
[Vol. 29
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ing to its terms or conditions to complete the contract. The crux
of the disagreement between the majority and minority holdings
was whether the option contract was conditional upon notice (dis-
senting opinion) or upon payment or tender of payment by the
optionee (majority opinion).4
As with all other offers, the offeror of an option is free to
specify any means of acceptance that he desires and "can make
his offered promise conditional upon any facts and performances
that he sees fit."'25 Corbin gives the following example regarding
an option to buy:
In consideration of $100 paid, 0 promises B to convey Blackacre
on payment of $5,000 within 30 days. In the absence of evidence
showing that this language is elliptical the form of acceptance
and the condition of O's duty are the actual tender of $5,000
within 30 days. Nothing is said about a notice of acceptance;
and the giving of such a notice would have no effect, unless the
contrary intention can be found by reading between the lines
and by drawing inferences from surrounding factors."
The above shows that, in specifying the mode of acceptance
and the condition of his duty the option giver can cause the
contract either to remain unilateral as before the acceptance or
to become bilateral.27
The majority in Cotter v. Tapp held that the payment by Tapp
of the sum stipulated in the lease for the second option was the
method prescribed for accepting the option. 28 It is equally plausi-
ble that the provision of the contract fixed only the price for the
option and not the method of acceptance, and being silent as to
notice requirements, intended a reasonable time of notification
before the option expired. However, the strict interpretation of




It is assumed that in most cases the optionor expects accept-
ance by the giving of notice;" therefore, the courts are prone to
24. "In order to make a bargain, it is necessary that the acceptor shall give in return
for the offeror's promise exactly the consideration which the offeror requests. If an act is
requested, that very act and no other must be given." 1 S. WILUSTON, CONTRACTS § 73
(1957) (footnotes omitted); accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 61 (1973).
25. 1A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 264 at 513 (1963).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 514.
28. - S.C. at , 230 S.E.2d at 718.
29. See notes 33-36 and accompanying text infra.




Published by Scholar Commons, 1977
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
interpret the agreement in such a way that the contract will be-
come bilateral after proper notice of acceptance 3' and operative
without any tender or payment, even when such tender remains
a condition of the duty to perform.3 2 However, as the majority
opinion pointed out, it is well settled in this state that option
contracts are strictly construed in favor of the optionor and
against the optionee 3  with time being considered of the essence.
3
1
Therefore, exact compliance with the terms of the option is re-
quired, and the consideration for a renewal option must be paid
or tendered before the original time limit expires unless there are
express provisions to the contrary in the lease.35 The court recog-
nized that this may produce harsh results in option cases, but
held that these results must be tolerated to further more compel-
ling considerations of public policy. The majority of the supreme
31. Id. at 514. The dissent took this position as to the interpretation of the option,
- S.C. at , 230 S.E.2d at 720.
32. IA A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 264 at 514-15 (1963).
33. - S.C. at _ 230 S.E.2d at 717. E.g., Southern Silica Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
Haefer, 215 S.C. 480, 497, 56 S.E.2d 321, 328 (1949); A.C. Tuxbury Lumber Co. v. Byrd,
131 S.C. 32, 127 S.E. 267 (1925).
34. Pope v. Goethe, 175 S.C. 394, 399, 179 S.E. 319, 321 (1935). "If the option requires
performance in a certain manner, time is of the essence and exact compliance with the
terms of the option are required." - S.C. at _ 230 S.E.2d at 717-18. See also Annot.,
44 A.L.R.2d 1359, 1362-77 (1955); Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 1404, 1427 (1957). The defendant
Tapp sought to introduce evidence that the plaintiff had waived the time limit for exercis-
ing the renewal option by its course of dealings with the defendant. The court held that
this constituted new matter which should have been affirmatively pleaded in the answer;
therefore, introduction of the evidence was improper and could not serve as a basis for
avoiding summary judgment, - S.C. at _ 230 S.E.2d at 719. In the alternative, the
lower court also found that the evidence sought to be introduced failed to indicate a
genuine issue as to any material fact. - S.C. at _ 230 S.E.2d at 719. In any event,
the court held that A.C. Tuxbury Lumber Co. v. Byrd, 131 S.C. 32, 127 S.E. 267 (1925),
would be controlling since time is of the essence in option contracts unless otherwise
stated.
35. A.C. Tuxbury Lumber Co. v. Byrd, 131 S.C. at 41, 127 S.E. at 270 (citing Min-
shew v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp., 98 S.C, 8, 81 S.E. 1027 (1914)). See also Gray v.
Marion County Lumber Co., 102 S.C. 289, 86 S.E. 640 (1915). However, it should be noted
that in these cases, the optionor never received notice of the optionee's intention to renew
or extend the option until after the expiration date had passed. - S.C. at -, 230
S.E.2d at 720-21 (dissenting opinion).
36. In Dargan v. Page, 222 S.C. 520, 73 S.E.2d 705 (1952) the court recognized that:
[Slound legal doctrine demands that at the option of the owner, compliance
with the very letter of the option may be exacted, the basic reasons being that
the contract is unilateral in character, tying up the title and rights of ownership
of the optionor, and giving the optionee "a right and privilege" which only by
strict compliance with the terms of the option can be transformed into a mu-
tually binding contract of sale.
Id. at 533, 73 S.E.2d at 711. However, this case, unlike Tapp, dealt with an expression of
intention to exercise the option after the expiration date.
6
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court continued to adhere to the rigid interpretation of options in
South Carolina, reaffirming past decisions and affirming dicta in
those cases requiring actual payment or tender to exercise an
option, regardless of notice given.
37
III. INSTALLMENT SALES CONTRACTS
In Davenport v. Unicapital Corp.38 the South Carolina Su-
preme Court addressed two important issues: usury in an install-
ment sales contract and the application of the holder in due
course doctrine to a finance company purchaser of the contract.
At the outset, it should be noted that the precise facts of this case
would now be covered by the Federal Truth in Lending Act,39
Federal Trade Regulation Rule (Preservation of Consumer's
Claims and Defenses),4" the South Carolina Consumer Protection
(Uniform Consumer Credit) Code,41 and the South Carolina
Unfair Trade Practices Act.
4 2
On May 30, 1968, Mr. and Mrs. Davenport, the respondents,
had executed a written contract with Garden City Home Im-
provements, Inc., for the purchase and installation of aluminum
siding and other repairs and construction work to be done on their
property. 3 The contract provided for an installment plan of pay-
ment wherein the Davenports would pay the sum of $2,360.00 in
eighty-four equal monthly payments of $54.96 for a total price
of $4,616.64;"4 however, it did not mention that a time price dif-
ferential or a higher credit price was included. On the same date
the Davenports executed a negotiable promissory note payable to
Garden City Home Improvements, Inc., which corresponded to
the payment terms of the contract. Thereafter, on June 12, 1968,
respondent Mildred Davenport executed a written "Completion
Certificate" which in addition to acknowledging acceptable per-
formance of the work, stated that they (the Davenports) "were
offered a cash price and a higher Time Price and have agreed to
37. See cases cited at notes 33-36 supra.
38. - S.C. - 230 S.E.2d 905 (1976).
39. Consumer Credit Protection (Truth in Lending) Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681t
(1970), as amended by Equal Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691e (Supp. 1974).
40. 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1977) enacted pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-57 (1970).
41. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-101 to 37-9-101 (1976).
42. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-10 to 39-5-160 (1976).
43. Record at 8.
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accept the higher Time Price."45 To secure the note, the Daven-
ports, on June 13, 1968, executed and gave a mortgage on the real
estate, which recited the terms set forth in the contract. On that
same date the appellant, allegedly an entity independent of the
contractor-payee," purchased the note and mortgage without re-
course from Garden City Home Improvements, Inc.
The Davenports brought suit to have the mortgage securing
the promissory note declared paid and satisfied in full and to
recover judgment for double the amount of interest paid, as sanc-
tioned by South Carolina law upon a finding of usury. 7 The ap-
pellant denied that the transaction was usurious, alleged that it
was a holder in due course, and pleaded merger, waiver, and
estoppel as additional defenses. The lower court affirmed the
findings of the special referee that the transaction was in fact
usurious, that Unicapital was not a holder in due course and that
the defenses of merger, waiver, and estoppel were not applicable.
Denying Unicapital's plea of prejudice on behalf of the trial
judge,48 the judgment and the referee's fee of $500.009 were af-
firmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
45. Id. at 55 (Exhibit 4).
46. Id. at 6. However, see note 48 infra.
47. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-50 (1976) provides:
Usury - Any person who shall receive or contract to receive as interest any
greater amount than is provided for in § 34-31-30 shall forfeit all interest and
the costs of the action and such portion of the original debt as shall be due shall
be recovered without interest or costs. When any amount so charged or con-
tracted for has been actually received by such person he shall also forfeit double
the total amount received in respect of interest, to be collected by a separate
action or allowed as a counterclaim in any action brought to recover the princi-
pal sum.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-30 (1976) provided for a maximum rate of interest of seven per
cent (7%) at the time this transaction was entered into. Under the foregoing contract (see
text accompanying note 44 supra) the deferred payment price of $4,616.64 produced an
interest rate of approximately 14%. - S.C. at _ 230 S.E.2d at 907. See 91 C.J.S.
Usury § 35 (1955).
48. The appellants charged bias and prejudice of the trial judge based on statements
in his order to the effect:
(1) that the rule of law, permitting evidence dehors the written agreement to
show that, though legal on its face, it was in fact illegal, was designed to
"prevent unscrupulous creditors from covering up their usurious interest by
means equivalent to that which was being used in the case at Bar;" and
(2) that the trial judge was persuaded that the appellant, instead of acting
independently, was "in league with the Home Improvement Company."
- S.C. at -, 230 S.E.2d at 910. See text at note 46 supra.
49. The supreme court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in award-
ing the $500.00 fee to the special referee. In so holding, the court noted "the competence
of the Special Referee, the time consumed in disposing of the case, the legal issues in-
volved, and the thorough and complete report filed." Id.
8




The first issue considered by the supreme court was whether
the transaction was usurious. The appellant argued that all of the
documents should be considered as one transaction to determine
whether it provided for a permissible time price differential" or
a charge of usurious interest. Thus, the contention was that the
completion certificate, signed two weeks after the contract, which
made reference to a time price, should be considered as part of
the transaction to show conclusively that a time price was in-
tended instead of interest." The supreme court rejected this argu-
ment stating only that whatever effect the completion certificate
had on the determination of whether the amount was intended
as a loan or as a time price differential was a question of fact;
52
and since the finding by the referee and the trial judge that there
50. A time price differential is the difference between a quoted price for immediate
payment (or cash price) and a quoted price for deferred payment (or time price). This time
price differential is a well-established exception to the usury laws. See, e.g., Hogg v.
Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1861) (established the time price exception to the usury
laws in the United States); Wilson v. J.E. French Co., 214 Cal. 188, 4 P.2d 537 (1931);
Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wash. 2d 378, 156 P.2d 408 (1945). See generally 45 AM. JuR. 2d
Interest and Usury § 2 (1969); Note, Judicial and Legislative Treatment of "Usurious"
Credit Sales, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1143, 1145-46 (1958).
The two-price requirement limits the exception to sales, causing the loan-sale distinc-
tion to be an important determinant in the application of the time price exception to a
particular transaction. See generally Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065, 1124-60 (1967). A sale of
property is further excepted from the usury laws in that it is neither a loan nor a forbear-
ance of money and, therefore, does not fit under the general definition of usury, which is
"the exaction of a greater sum for the use of money than is the highest rate of interest
allowed by law." Id. at 1070-71; see 45 AM. JUR. 2d Interest and Usury § 2 (1969).
The fact that the price for a sale on credit is higher than the seller would require if
the sale was for cash does not necessarily indicate the existence of usury; but if the
transaction is found to be "actually a device to evade the usury laws, it is not saved by
any attempted differential between a claimed 'cash' price and a claimed 'credit' price."
Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d at 1124; see Osborne v. Fuller, 92 S.C. 338, 341, 75 S.E. 557, 558
(1912); Brown v. Crandall, 218 S.C. 124, 127-28, 61 S.E.2d 761, 762-63 (1950). If the court
does find the transaction to be a device or plan to evade the usury laws it will "disregard
the form and consider the substance of the transaction." Id. at 128, 61 S.E.2d at 763. The
case of Brown v. Crandall is commented upon at length in Note, Applicability of Usury
Laws to Credit Installment Sales, 4 S.C.L.Q. 290 (1951), which also gives an excellent and
comprehensive treatment of the development of South Carolina law on usury as well as
discussing the development of the time price doctrine.
The interest/time price differential dichotomy has troubled the courts for some time.
Some courts have continued to apply the time price rule despite the existence of circum-
stances from which other courts would infer a scheme to avoid the usury laws. See, e.g.,
Aglio v. Carousel, Inc., 34 Misc. 2d 79, 228 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1962); Equipment Fin., Inc. v.
Grannas, 207 Pa. Super. Ct. 363, 218 A.2d 81 (1966).
51. Brief for Appellant at 16-17.
52. - S.C. at __, 230 S.E.2d at 908.
9
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was no valid time price differential was amply supported by the
evidence, the determination of usury was affirmed.1
3
The referee considered the following factors as bases for de-
termining the contract usurious: (1) The contract made no provi-
sion which would allow the plaintiff to pay off the amount due in
any other manner than eighty-four payments at $54.96;-1 (2) the
discount rate, which was mentioned in the contract,55 was in-
tended to mean interest;" (3) the contract mentioned neither a
higher time price nor a total time price;5 7 (4) the contract pro-
vided that the contractor would select a lender and that the Dav-
enports would comply with "all things requisite in the opinion of
the contractor in securing a loan,"5 which "clearly indicated an
intention on the part of all parties that the contract was not one
for which the [Davenports] were expected to pay anything ex-
53. Id. The analysis of a transaction to determine if it is a usurious loan or a permissi-
ble time price differential is as follows: If the transaction is a bona fide sale, and the
vendor makes it clear to the purchaser that the credit price is higher than the cash price
and gives him a free choice as to which price he wants to pay, there is no usury; but if
the transaction as a whole is actually a scheme or device to circumvent the statutes
against usury, the mere quotation of a claimed cash price and a claimed credit price will
not save it. See cases cited at Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065 §§ 4 & 11 (1967).
Some factors which courts have advanced as supporting a finding of a usurious loan
rather than an installment time price sale may be listed as follows:
(1) That the seller did not clearly quote two distinct prices and give the buyer
an actual opportunity to choose as between them, id. at § 13;
(2) that the conditional sale contract, chattel mortgage, or other supporting
paper signed by the buyer was immediately assigned by the seller to a person
or concern engaged in the business of loaning money or discounting commercial
paper, with whom the seller maintained very close relations on a more or less
permanent basis, id. at § 14;
(3) that the sale contract contained charges against the purchaser phrased in
misleading or ambiguous language which tended to cover up the essential nature
of the transaction as a sale for cash, part of the price being borrowed by the
purchaser, id. at § 15;
(4) that the excess of the claimed "credit" price over the claimed "cash" price
was calculated in language usually reserved for computing interest on a loan,
id. at § 17.
54. Record at 52 (Exhibit 1).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 83.
57. Id. at 93.
58. The contract provision referred to stated:
It is mutually agreed and understood by and between the parties hereto that
the owner(s) will and can qualify for a loan at any agency selected by the
contractor; owner further agrees to cooperate at all times with the contractor,
and the owner further agrees to do all things requisite in the opinion of the
contractor in securing loan.
Id. at 52 (Exhibit 1).
10
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cept the regular monthly payments," as "stated in the contract
. . . . [TIherefore, . . . there was no time price differential
available to the defendant.
'59
The trial court affirmed the report explaining that because
the Davenports were not given the alternative of paying cash or
accepting a higher price for deferring payment, there was no valid
time price differential."
The implication of the foregoing is that a payment plan in
an installment sales contract that includes a substantial time
price differential, to avoid being held a mere scheme to evade the
usury laws, must allow the purchaser a fair and meaningful
choice as to method of payment after he has been given full dis-
closure in the contract of the cost of delaying payment.
In recognition of the need for meaningful disclosure of credit
terms to facilitate "credit shopping," 1 Congress enacted the
Truth in Lending Act, 2 effective July 1, 1969. This act requires
creditors to make certain disclosures in connection with consumer
credit transactions, necessarily including installment sales con-
tracts. The type of disclosure required is determined by the type
of transaction. In the Davenports' contract, an installment sale
transaction for consumer goods, which was a "closed-end credit
sale, '6 3 the proper disclosures would -have included
the cash price; the downpayment [if any]; the "unpaid balance
of the cash price" . . .; itemized additional charges not in-
cluded in the finance charge; the sum of all of these amounts
.; any prepaid finance charges or required compensating
deposits which must be deducted from the amount financed
* . .; the "amount financed" . . .; the "deferred payment
price," which is the amount financed plus the total finance
charge; the finance charge expressed as an annual percentage
rate ...; the repayment schedule ...; default and delin-
quency charges; a description of any security interest and a clear
identification of the collateral; a description of any prepayment
59. Id. at 83.
60. Id. at 107.
61. B. CLARK & J. FONSECA, HANDLING CONSUMER CREDIT CASES § 38 at 138 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as CLARK & FONSECA].
62. Consumer Credit Protection (Truth In Lending) Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681t
(1970), as amended by Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691-1691e (Supp.
1974).
63. A sale on credit having a fixed maturity is a closed-end credit sale as opposed to
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penalty; and an identification of the method of computing re-
bates of unearned finance charge upon prepayment. 4
Effective January 1, 1975, the South Carolina Consumer Pro-
tection Code 5 specifically requires compliance with the Federal
Truth in Lending Act. It also sets a maximum credit service
charge " depending on the amount of the unpaid balance."
B. Holder in Due Course Doctrine
Having determined that the contract was usurious, and since
a defense of usury may not be valid against a holder in due
course, " the court next made a determination as to the status of
Unicapital Corporation as the transferee of the note and mort-
gage. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the special referee and circuit judge that the appellant was not
a holder in due course, that is, (1) a holder of a negotiable instru-
ment, (2) who took it for value, (3) in good faith, (4) without
notice that it was overdue or had been dishonored or of any defen-
ses against or claim to it on the part of any person. " It was
64. CLARK & FONSECA § 41 at 144-45. For more information on credit transactions
covered by the Federal Truth in Lending Act, see generally J. FONSECA, CONSUMER CREDIT
COMPLIANCE MANUAL (1975); CLARK & FONSECA, supra note 61; CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH).
65. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-301 (1976).
66. "The 'credit service charge' means the sum of (1) all charges payable directly or
indirectly by the buyer and imposed directly or indirectly by the seller as an incident to
the extention of credit, including .. . [a] time price differential, service, carrying or
other charge, however denominated." The term also includes any "premium or other
service charge for any guarantee or insurance protecting the seller against the buyer's
default or other credit loss." S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-109 (1976).
67. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-201 (1976).
68. The Uniform Commercial Code was enacted in South Carolina on January 1,
1968, and is now a portion of the Code of Laws of South Carolina at S.C. CODE ANN. §§
36-1-101 to 36-10-103 (1976). Under the U.C.C., usury is a defense against a holder in due
course only if the effect of the usury is to make the entire transaction null and void. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 36-3-305, Comment 6 (1976). See 11 AM. JUR. 2d Bills and Notes § 679 (1963).
69. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-302(1)(a)-(c) (1976) provides: "The purpose of the holder
in due course concept is to allow commercial paper to flow freely by protecting a holder
who takes for value, in good faith, and without knowledge, from defenses that would be
good against the seller." 39 Mo. L. REv. 111, 114 (1974); accord, Comment, Judicial
Limitations on Holder in Due Course Claims, 42 U. COLO. L. REv. 439 (1970).
Many courts have denied the holder in due course immunity to finance companies
after finding a close relationship between the seller and finance company. Jones, Finance
Companies as Holders in Due Course of Consumer Paper, 1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 177, 181-
83; Comment, Judicial Limitations on Holder in Due Course Claims, supra at 440. E.g.,
Vasquez v. Superior Ct. of San Joaquin Co., 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 484 P.2d 964, 9 U.C.C.
Rptg. Serv. 11 (1971). See generally [1975] 2 U.C.C. SERV. (BENDER) § 11.07 [hereinafter
cited as BENDER'S U.C.C. SERV.1; Benson and Squillante, The Role of the Holder in Due
12
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undisputed that, except for notice, Unicapital met these require-
ments. 70 Under S.C. Code § 36-3-304(1)(b), a "purchaser has
notice of a claim or defense if [he] has notice that the obligation
of any party is voidable in whole or in part,71 or that all parties
have been discharged. '72 Unicapital had the sales contract in its
possession prior to the purchase of the note and mortgage from
Home Improvements, Inc.; thus, the issue presented was
whether Unicapital had notice sufficient to defeat its claimed
status as a holder in due course. The court reasoned that the
underlying executory contract was usurious and that because the
appellant had notice of the contract, it had sufficient notice of
defenses against the note to preclude its status as a holder in due
course.
Unicapital's argument was that even though it had actual
knowledge of the contract, it did not have actual knowledge of the
claim of usury asserted against the note until a later time since
the difference in time price and cash price could have been a valid
time price differential .7 Thus, Unicapital urged upon the court a
Course Doctrine in Consumer Credit Transactions, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 428-32 (1974).
The question whether lenders purchasing installment sales contracts should be deemed
holders in due course has been vigorously debated in the law reviews. See, e.g., Jordan
and Warren, Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 387, 436 (1968); Murphy,
Another "Assault Upon the Citadel": Limiting the Use of Negotiable Notes and Waiver-
of-Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 667 (1968); Note, Consumer
Financing, Negotiable Instruments, and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Solution to the
Judicial Dilemma, 55 CORNELL L.Q. 611 (1970).
70. - S.C. at -_, 230 S.E.2d at 908.
71. The author in 2 BENDER'S U.C.C. SERV. § 11.0515] explains that to make sense
the section must be read in a particular way. He explains that the introductory language,
"notice of a claim or defense" should be read as a "phrase of art" and that the definition
of notice found in § 1-201(25) is not applicable; however, the § 1-201(25) definition does
apply to notice in "if the purchaser has notice." Hence, the subsection may be read as
follows: "A purchaser has notice-of-a-claim-or-defense if the purchaser has (1) knowledge,
(2) notification, or (3) reason to know that the obligation of any party is voidable in whole
or in part, or that all parties have been discharged." BENDER'S U.C.C. SERV., supra.
The author further explains:
Instead of using the term "defenses," the subsection refers to the voidability of
obligations. The only effect of the Code language is to limit the concept of
defenses by excluding counterclaims or set-off that may be available as against
a party but which do not go to the enforceability of the obligation. It should be
noted that where there is notice of the voidability of an obligation of any party,
the purchaser cannot be a holder in due course, and that this is true even if the
obligation is voidable only in part.
Id.
72. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-304(1)(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
73. - S.C. at -, 230 S.E.2d at 908.
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totally subjective interpretation of "notice" under section 36-3-
304(1) (b) .7 The supreme court rejected this argument and in-
ferred sufficient knowledge from the fact that before purchasing
the respondent's obligation, Unicapital had received the note,
mortgage, and completion certificate together with the contract,
which showed on its face a charge of usurious interest."6 Although
the court did not explain its analysis further, it can be surmised
that the supreme court was interpreting section 36-3-304 with
reference to the definition of notice found in section 36-1-
201(25)." Under the provisions of section 36-1-201(25), a person
has "'notice' of a fact" when: (a) he has actual knowledge of it;
or (b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or (c) from all
the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question
he has reason to know that it exists.7 1 The court may have inter-
preted the "reason to know" standard as requiring such notice as
a reasonable man would have had from all of the facts and cir-
cumstances actually known; however, it seems more probable
that the courts was imputing notice that the obligation was void-
able from facts that should have been realized by Unicapital,
Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 So. CAL. L. Ray. 48 (1966).
75. Brief for Appellant at 13-15.
76. - S.C. at -, 230 S.E.2d at 908.
77. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(25) (1976).
The general definition of notice contained in Section 1-201(25) is important to
a discussion of the holder in due course requirement that a purchaser take
without notice of adverse claims, dishonor, defenses, or overdueness, because
the word "notice" appears as part of the description in sections 10.3-302 and
10.3-304 of what constitutes "notice of dishonor," "notice of adverse claims and
defenses," and "notice of overdueness." When the word forms a part of these
descriptions, it is used in the sense of its Section 10.1-201 definition.
2 BENDER'S U.C.C. SERV. at § 11.05(2). See Official Comment 1 to § 10.3-304; see also
note 71 supra.
78. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(25) (1976) (emphasis added). BENDER'S U.C.C. SERV.
explains that "subparagraph (c) includes a test of notice that involves use of something
like a reasonable man standard," and refers to the Comments to § 9 of the RESTATEMENT
OF AGENCY for an explanation of when a transferee has "reason to know":
A person has reason to know of a fact if he has information from which a person
of ordinary intelligence, or of the superior intelligence which such person may
have, would infer that the fact in question exists or that there is such a substan-
tial chance of its existence that, if exercising reasonable care with reference to
the matter in question, his action would be predicated upon the assumption of
its possible existence.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 9, Comment 46 (1958). "It is the 'reason to know'
method of obtaining notice that seems to give the most difficulty. In a sense, the test is
an objective one: it clearly does not require that the purchaser have actual knowledge of
the adverse claims, dishonor, defenses, or overdueness." 2 BENDER'S U.C.C. SERV. at §
11.05(3) (1972). See also note 71 supra.
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using reasonable commercial standards as a yardstick.79
The further argument was that section 36-3-304 Official
Comment 380 should be read to exclude notice of a claim of usury
as notice of a claim or defense which would preclude a purchaser
from being a holder in due course since South Carolina "does not
void a usurious contract but rather imposes forfeitures and penal-
ties" thereon; therefore, section 36-3-304(1)(b) would not apply
because the obligation itself was not voidable in whole or in part.'
The court, however, found that since the usury statute allows
double recovery of interest,8 the additional interest would cut
into the original obligation causing it to be voidable in part; fur-
thermore, since a usury claim can be brought in a separate action,
79. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that:
The record sustains the conclusion that appellant received the contract (which
showed on its face a charge of usurious interest) along with the note, mortgage
and completion certificate (signed by only one of the makers of the note) before
it decided to purchase respondent's obligation. The record therefore sustains the
concurrent findings of the referee and the trial judge that appellant had knowl-
edge of the fact that the transaction was usurious.
- S.C. at -, 230 S.E.2d at 908. Thus, Unicapital was deemed to have notice of the
defense of usury, regardless of actual knowledge, perhaps based upon reasonable expecta-
tions of conduct of commercial institutions. In Von Gohren v. Pacific Nat'l Bank of Wash.,
505 P.2d 467, 12 U.C.C. Rptg. Serv. 133 (Wash. App. 1973), the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington adopted this view noting that:
This argument [see note 78 supra and accompanying text] makes the "reason
to know" method of notice an objective one, and would not require that a taker
have actual knowledge of an adverse claim in order to be charged with notice of
such claim, but would premise notice upon reasonable commercial standards.
This line of reasoning has the support of at least one scholar. See 2 Bender's
UCC Service, F. Hart & W. Willer, Commercial Paper § 11.05(2) (1972). We
agree with the logic of the argument, the code has seen fit to distinguish "good
faith" and "notice" by setting them forth as two separate requirements and, in
article 1, in defining them separately.
505 P.2d at 472, 12 U.C.C. Rptg. Serv. at 140. See also Fagan, Notice and Good Faith in
Article 3 of the U.C.C., 17 U. Prrr. L. REv. 176 (1956); Braucher, UCC Article 3-Com-
mercial Paper-New York Variations, 17 RUrTaEs L. Rav. 57, 66-69 (1962), in accord with
the foregoing authority.
80. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-304 (1976) Official Comment 3 provides: "'Voidable'
obligation in paragraph (b) of subsection (1) is intended to limit the provision to notice
of defense which will permit any party to avoid his original obligation on the instrument,
as distinguished from a set-off or counter-claim."
81. Brief for Appellant at 11. See note 47 supra. The crux of this argument was that
the usury provision (§ 34-31-50) sets up only a counterclaim or set-off for double the
amount of usurious interest charged and does not void either part or all of the obligation,
but rather imposes penalties and forfeitures. The appellant's contention was that since
only the interest is voidable under § 8-5 (now § 34-31-50 (1976)) and not the whole contract
(principal must still be paid), it, therefore, did not have notice that the obligation was
voidable.
82. See note 47 supra.
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rather than only as a counterclaim or setoff, section 36-3-304
Official Comment 3 was inapplicable." The further exceptions of
merger, 4 estoppel, and waiver were summarily dismissed.
8 5
The South Carolina Consumer Protection Code8 and the
83. - S.C. at -, 230 S.E.2d at 908.
84. Essentially, the third defense Was that when the note and mortgage were signed
by the Davenports, the contract was merged into them and that reference to the contract
would be of no effect whatever in that it was now a part of the note and mortgage.
The Appellant relied upon the doctrine set forth in Charleston W. Ry. v. Joyce, 231
S.C. 493, 99 S.E.2d 187 (1957), that
[aill conversations and parole agreements between the parties prior to or con-
temporaneous with the written agreement are considered to have been merged
therein so that they cannot be given in evidence for the purpose of changing the
contract or showing an intention or understanding different from that which is
expressed in the written agreement.
Id. at 502, 99 S.E.2d at 191 (emphasis added). However, the special referee determined
that reference to the contract could be made since the contract did not change the terms
of mortgage or note, but only explained what interest was being charged whereas the note
and mortgage were silent as to the amount of interest charged. Record at 85-86. The South
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding the case of Rainwater v. Bonnette, 151 S.C.
474, 149 S.E. 254 (1929) to be controlling.
85. The court held the findings of the referee and the trial judge concerning estoppel
and waiver to be "sustained by the record" without further discussion. - S.C. at -,
230 S.E.2d at 909. The contention of Unicapital was that an estoppel arose because the
Davenports had signed the completion certificate which expressly mentioned a time price
difference and that they had received outside advice. The special referee stated, "Estoppel
arises when a party misrepresents or conceals facts and the other party relies thereon and
changes his position in reliance upon it." Record at 88. Noting that the Davenports had
only meager education and little business experience, the referee decided that they should
not be estopped. Furthermore, the referee determined that waiver also did not apply.
Record at 88 & 89.
86. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-403 (UCCC § 2.403) (1976) provides: "With respect to a
consumer credit sale or consumer lease, the creditor may not take a negotiable instrument
other than a check dated not later than ten days after its issuance as evidence of the
obligation of the consumer." S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-404 (UCCC § 2.404) (1976) provides
in part:
(1) With respect to a consumer credit sale or consumer lease, an assignee
of the rights of the seller or lessor is subject to all claims and defenses of the
consumer against the seller or lessor arising from the sale or lease of property or
services, notwithstanding that the assignee is a holder in due course of a negotia-
ble instrument issued in violation of the provisions prohibiting certain negotia-
ble instruments (Section 2.403).
(2) A claim or defense of a consumer specified in subsection (1) may be
asserted against the assignee under this section only if the consumer has made
a good faith attempt to obtain satisfaction from the seller or lessor with respect
to the claim or defense and then only to the extent of the amount owing to the
assignee with respect to the sale or lease of the property or services as to which
the claim or defense arose at the time the assignee has written notice of the
claim or defense.
(5) An agreement may not limit or waive the claims or defenses of a
consumer under this section.
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Federal Trade Commission trade regulation rules 7 now preserve
the buyers' claims and defenses arising from the sale against the
assignee of the rights of the seller with respect to consumer credit
sales, notwithstanding the fact that the assignee is a holder in due
course of a negotiable instrument.88 This is true even if the sales
contract contains a clause that attempts to waive the defenses
against the assignee. 5 The South Carolina Consumer Protection
Code also protects the consumer where the seller, instead of
transferring the contract, refers the buyer to a finance company
which then makes to the buyer a direct loan of cash to complete
the purchase."
Hugh M. Hadden
87. Federal Trade Commission Regulation Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1976), provides in
part:
In connection with any Purchase Money Loan (as that term is defined in §
433.1) or any sale or lease of goods or services, in or affecting commerce as
"commerce" is defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act, it constitutes an
unfair or deceptive act or practice within the meaning of Section 5 of that Act,
for a seller or a creditor, directly or indirectly, to take or receive a consumer
credit contract which fails to contain the following provision in at least ten
point, boldface type:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT
TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD AS-
SERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED
PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY
HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID
BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-10 to 39-5-160
(1976) also prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices as construed by the Federal Trade Commission and establishes state enforcement
procedures. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20 (1976) provides:
(a) Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.
(b) It is the intent of the legislature that in construing paragraph (a) of
this section the courts will be guided by the interpretations given by the Federal
Trade Commission and the Federal Courts to § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended.
88. See notes 86 and 87 supra.
89. Id.
90. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3o410 (UCCC § 3.410) (1976).
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